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Abstract - Classical rationality as accepted by game
theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment
has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions
result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and
moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions
remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is
widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow
the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game
theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical
rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions—
risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All
of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories,
making claims about how individual human minds work
when choosing. All of them are fundamentally wrong in
assuming one kind of consistency or another. Or at least,
all of the proposals for consistency in belief, preference,
and action with which we are aware turn out to be wrong
when tested experimentally.
Keywords: Behavioral game theory, experiments, cognition,
Trust, Dictator, Donation
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Introduction

Game theoretic models are utilized for behavioral
predictions across a variety of domains such as allocation
of security forces [1], allocation of health care services [2],
and the design of political, social and market institutions
[3; for relevant surveys see: 4, 5, 6, 7]. Despite the
widespread use of game theoretic models to explain human
behavior, we often observe behavior, from voting, to the
divergence of political parties platforms, to market bubbles
and crashes that do not readily accord with the predictions
derived from game theory [8].
To address the discrepancy between predicted and
actual behavior, scholars have proposed four common
patches: (1) cognitive biases or errors in how people make
decisions [9, 10, 11, 12]; (2) a mismatch between the
experimenter’s defined payoffs and an individual’s actual
utility [13, 14]; (3) the effects of uncertainty, bounded
search ability, limited time for learning and equilibration,
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or limits in the ability of thinking about others’ likely
behavior [15]; and (4) newer and more clever equilibrium
refinements that capture the folk psychology of different
game theorists [16, 17, 18, 19].
While it is common to report that experimental
subjects do not make choices that comport with Nash
equilibrium strategies (or even von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility maximization), we should not infer that human
reasoning is thus somehow flawed. It is perhaps the case
that our existing, deductive, models of human reasoning
are too limited. Humans are able to solve many tasks that
are quite difficult [20, 21]. Like vision, taste and smell,
human intelligence and behavior are varied and flexible,
creating an enormous diversity of beliefs and choices, but
the models that we use to predict behavior do not and
cannot capture this diversity. To build a better theory of
human behavior, we must start with an appreciation for
how we actually reason. As cognitive science has shown,
intuitive notions of how the mind works (vision, language,
memory, etc.) may be very useful for humans to hold as
scaffolding
for
consciousness,
but
they
are
comprehensively wrong and simplistic. Intuitive notions of
how we reason are not a basis for science. How we reason
must be discovered, not assumed, and certainly not
borrowed from intuition
One of the principal problems stems from the core
solution strategy for noncooperative games of Nash
equilibrium. While it is mathematically elegant, it requires
agents in the game to have correct and consistent beliefs
[22]. To have “correct beliefs” we assume that the agents,
or the players in a game, to regard all other players as
being “Nash players” and to predict that they all follow
Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies. It is also typically
required that players have “common knowledge” that they
are all Nash players, that is, that they know that other
players know that they themselves are following Nash
equilibrium strategies, and so on, ad infinitum. Others
have pointed out that “Common Nash refinements have
similar attributes. Although these refinements differ in
what they allow players to know and believe, they continue
to require that actors share identical conjectures of other
players’ strategies” [23, p. 106]. If players do not believe
that other players will adopt NE strategies, however, it is
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no longer true that players’ best response to each other will
be to follow a NE strategy. The natural, biological, or
cognitive means by which this comes about are not
specified, merely that, given enough time and effort,
players can all learn what behaviors to adopt and when to
adopt them, or, baring this eventuality, that societies will
adopt rules, laws or norms to restrict and channel behavior
to more efficient forms. Prior work on subjects’ beliefs in
experimental settings suggest that subjects possess nonequilibrium beliefs [24, 25] and that in at least some
settings their behavior can be reasonable, given their
beliefs [26].
In what follows, rather than trying to stitch together
measurements from different experiments, with different
protocols, run under different conditions and at different
times, we use a within-subjects design, run over a single
academic term, to investigate choices in a large battery of
single-shot games. Within our battery of tasks we elicit
subjects’ beliefs about the other subject’s actions, plus we
elicit recursive beliefs about other subjects’ beliefs in these
games. We demonstrate that subjects’ actions and beliefs
are consistently inconsistent, deviating from one person to
another and for each person from one task to another. A
given subject is often not consistent in action across nearly
identical choice moments at different times in the same
within-subject battery of tasks and a given subject is often
not consistent even at the same time in their beliefs,
preferences and actions. We also see great variation across
subjects for a given task. For our specific battery, this
refutes not only Nash equilibrium but also the patches that
have been designed to explain deviation from it.

2 Experimental Design
We report on a number of tasks here related to the
well-known Trust Game [27]. In our experiments, subjects
know that their choices are always private and anonymous,
even to the experimenters at the time of the experiment
(i.e., double blind). Subjects receive no feedback during
the course of the experiment about the consequences of
their choices, except for quizzes related to the given tasks
(subjects may, for some of our tasks, be able to infer the
consequences of their choices). For each task, subjects are
randomly matched to another subject. Thus, to the extent
possible, every task is a single shot, separate from the prior
and future choices. Subjects are divided into two rooms, in
groups of ten in each room. We ensure that no subject
knows anyone else in either of the two rooms of the
experiment. As much as possible, then, this environment
creates a situation in which subjects derive their utility
solely from the payoffs in the experimental tasks and not
from concerns about reputation, signaling for future games,
experimenter demand, or other actions that are not related
to the immediate monetary payoffs we present.
The Trust Game (sometimes called the investment
game) involves two players. Each player begins with a $5

endowment. The first player (Player 1 or the “Investor”
[27]) chooses how many dollars, if any, to pass to an
anonymous second player (Player 2 or “Trustee” [27]). In
our experimental protocols, we use no labels other than
“the other person(s)” (to avoid a gaming frame). To avoid
suggesting an investment or reciprocity frame we label
each action as a “transfer.” The first player keeps any
money he does not pass. As in [27], the money that is
passed is tripled in value and the second player receives the
tripled amount. The second player at that point has the
original endowment of $5 plus three times the amount the
first player passed, and decides how much, if any, of that
total amount to return (i.e., transfer) to the first player. The
second player at the moment of choice in the Trust Game
is in a role that is equivalent to the role of Dictator in the
classic Dictator Game [see 8]. As in the Dictator Game, the
dominant strategy equilibrium, which is trivially the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), is that Player 2
will return $0. By backward induction, then Player 1 in the
Trust Game will send $0. This is also a dominant strategy.
As such, any amount sent by Player 1 to Player 2 should be
viewed by Player 1 as a donation, and we label the first
half of the Trust Game as what we call a Donation Game.
These equilibrium strategies derive from the
assumption is that all players maximize their monetary
payoff and that they believe that all other players do the
same. In the Trust Game, a Player 1 with these beliefs
would conclude that Player 2 will return nothing and so, as
a maximizer, Player 1 sends nothing. The beliefs that
players hold about other players lead to the belief at every
level of recursion that all players will send $0, and that
they will guess that others will send $0, and they will guess
that others will predict that everyone will send $0, and so
on, ad infinitum.
But what happens if a subject with these NE beliefs
finds himself off the equilibrium path? In the Trust Game,
only Player 2 could make a choice after finding himself or
herself presented with an off-the-equilibrium-path choice.
If Player 2 is gifted with anything more than his or her $5
endowment, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
strategy is still to send $0 back.
Every subject makes decisions first as Player 1. They
are then randomly paired with someone from the other
room and they make choices as Player 2. So everyone gets
to be Player 1 first, then Player 2, about 90 minutes later.
To limit learning, even if it is just learning about the
actions of a randomly assigned partner in another room, we
defer the choices for all subjects as Player 2 to the end of
the experiment. They thus play Trust twice, but in different
roles. Player 1 never learns the consequences of any of his
or her choices in the Trust Game. Player 2 can of course
infer the consequences of his or her own choices.
We add elements to the basic Trust Game to tap into
subjects’ beliefs. Our belief elicitation mechanism borrows
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from the idea of a prediction market [28], which in
experimental settings such as those described here have
been referred to as “scoring rules” [29, 30, and for a brief
survey see 8]. We do not ask subjects to report their
expectations, as some experimenters have done, in order to
prod strategic thinking, rather, we ask them to “guess”
other subjects’ choices, or to guess other subjects’
“predictions.” As with all of our protocols, we try to
provide little or no framing of the experimental tasks
offered to our subjects. Only after Player 1 makes his
choice about how much to transfer, do we ask him to guess
how much Player 2 will return. We then elicit Player 1’s
recursive beliefs about Player 2. So, we next ask Player 1
to guess what Player 2 will later predict how much Player
1 is transferring. We further ask Player 1 to guess Player
2’s prediction of Player 1’s guess of how much Player 2
will return. We also elicit each subject’s recursive beliefs
when they are in the role of Player 2. Before Player 2
learns Player 1’s choice, and thus before Player 2 knows
how much they have available to them, we ask Player 2 to
guess how much money Player 1 transferred. We also ask
Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted that Player
2 would guess that Player 1 transferred. After Player 2
learns Player 1’s transfer, we ask Player 2 to guess how
much Player 1 predicted she would return. All subjects
know that all subjects earn $3 for each correct guess and
earn nothing for a guess that is wrong. All subjects in our
experiments know this. We also allowed subjects to, in
essence, “double-down,” on each guess, adding a second
“bet” equal to $3 if they are correct in their guess and $0
otherwise. We also always quizzed our subjects with
respect to the instructions, paying them for correct
answers.
In calibrating these prediction questions prior to the
launch of our experiments we learned two things: (1) that
there does not exist an easy language for eliciting recursive
beliefs, so we made use of generic cartoon “heads” to
represent what subjects are predicting and “$” sign and
arrow icons to represent actions and the object of their
current attention; and (2) subjects laughed and failed to
answer our queries, even when diagrammed in cartoon
form, with written explanations. These two preliminary
findings suggested to us that people really do not have the
recursive beliefs required by NE.
The questions we ask vary slightly for each task, but
as an example, here is the exact question we ask Player 2:
“How much money do you guess the other person
transferred to you? If you guess correctly, you will earn $3.
If not, you will neither earn nor lose money.” We add
similar incentivized prediction tasks to various
experimental tasks. Players do not learn whether their
predictions were right or wrong and subjects never have
any information about other subjects’ guesses.
Subjects also make decisions in a variety of other

games, including the already mentioned Dictator Game and
what we call the Donation Game. In both these games,
each subject is randomly paired with yet other subjects in
the other room. In the Dictator Game, The Dictator (Player
1) and the Receiver (Player 2) have endowments identical
to those the subjects had when they were in the role of
Player 2 and Player 1 in Trust (although they have been
randomly rematched and they known they’ve been
randomly rematched). Accordingly, the Dictator Game
was identical right down to the specific endowments to the
second half of the Trust Game. In effect, each subject
replayed the second half of the Trust Game, but now
without the reciprocity frame. The SPNE is for the Dictator
to send $0 to the Receiver. The Donation Game is
identical, except that each player begins with a $5
endowment and the amount Player 1 chooses to send is
quadrupled before it is given to Player 2 (making it roughly
similar but not identical to the choice faced by Player 1 in
the Trust Game, without the possibility of reciprocity).
The dominant strategy and SPNE is again for the Donor to
send $0.
The subjects in our experiment completed the tasks
using pen and paper in a controlled classroom
environment. Subjects were recruited using flyers and
email and text messages distributed across a large public
California university and were not compelled to participate
in the experiment, although they were given $5 in cash
when they showed up and signed in. A total of 180 subjects
participated in this experiment. The experiment lasted
approximately two hours, and subjects received on average
$41 in cash. The experiment was followed sometime later
with a questionnaire, for which subjects were also paid.

3 Result: Subjects’ Beliefs in the
Trust Game
Common patches to help explain the commonly
observed departures to NE strategies (other-regarding
preferences, cognitive constraints, decision-making biases,
or equilibrium refinements) usually continue to maintain
the assumption that players deviate from game-theoretic
expectations in consistent ways. For example, if players
prefer to reduce inequality, that preference should be stable
across all manner of economic games [10]. Or, if players
cannot perform backward deletion of dominated subgames, as game theory requires, then this handicap should
operate in all game environments of equal difficulty [17,
18, 19]. In this section we focus both on whether subjects
have beliefs that are consistent with SPNE and whether
their beliefs are consistent across tasks (regardless of
alignment with SPNE). To date, there has been little focus
on identifying the extent to which players have consistent
beliefs or behavior across games.
Cognitive science gives us considerable reason to
doubt that players will behave identically across different

environments, because changes in environment lead to
changes in mental activation, which affects beliefs and
behavior. As Sherrington famously wrote, the state of the
brain is always shifting, “a dissolving pattern, always a
meaningful pattern, though never an abiding one” [32]. If
the particular tasks, and order of those tasks, induce
different mental activations, then belief and behavior
should vary accordingly. Our experiment is designed to
shed light on whether subjects have consistent beliefs and
make consistent choices.
In many of our tasks, we ask subjects to make guesses
about other players’ actions and predictions. Do subjects
believe what game theory assumes they believe? The
answer is that there is huge variance across what subjects
believe in a single game and also huge variance within
subjects from one task to another.
The SPNE in the Trust Game is that neither Player 1
nor Player 2 will send any money to the other. All should
believe that all others will predict that no one will send
money, and all such beliefs should be infinitely recursive,
so that Player A believes Player B believes Player A
believes Player B will send no money, and so on for any
number of steps and for any subject in any role A or B.
But we see quite the contrary in our experiments: only
68 of 180 subjects as Player 2 believe that Player 1 will
send nothing. In other words, 62% of subjects have
“incorrect” beliefs, that is, beliefs contrary to those that
support SPNE strategies.
Next we examine the guesses made by Player 1 of the
amount Player 2 will return. In what follows, we include
even the Player 1s who sent nothing. (Since Player 2
begins with a $5 endowment, Player 2 can transfer money
even if Player 1 sent nothing.) Ninety-two of the 180
subjects guess that Player 2 will return $0, but 88, or 49%,
believe that Player 2 will return some money. This means
that 49% of these subjects have “incorrect” beliefs. Their
beliefs diverge broadly from SPNE, across a large span of
possible returns.
We can compare subjects’ beliefs about others in one
part of the Trust Game with their choices in that same part
of the Trust Game. For example, we can examine the
difference between what a subject choose to do as Player 1
in the Trust Game, and what they believe as Player 2 that
Player 1 will do (and recall, when they are Player 2,
they’ve already made choices as Player 1). The modal
category is subjects believe that other subjects will play
like them: 109 of the 180 subjects guess that the choice of
the Player 1 with whom they are randomly matched will be
the same as their own choice when they were Player 1. For
these subjects, theory of mind might equal theory of self,
or this may simply represent the “false consensus” effect in
which people think others are more like them than they
actually are [31], or it might be akin to the curse of
knowledge, but we can’t really tell. Perhaps most

surprising, there is a large variance, with 71 subjects (39%)
making guesses that differ from their own choices.
We can also examine the number of subjects who
have beliefs consistent with NE across tasks. In the Trust
Game, subjects make predictions as Player 1 about the
behavior of Player 2 and as Player 2 about the behavior of
Player 1. We already demonstrated that in either single
task, a great many subjects do not have SPNE beliefs. If
Player 1 has NE beliefs, it means that this subject guessed
that Player 2 would return nothing. If Player 2 has NE
beliefs, it means that the subject guessed that Player 1
would send nothing. Overall, out of 180 subjects in our
analysis, only 63 subjects made guesses as both Player 1
and 2 that were consistent with NE beliefs. In other words,
only 35% of our subjects have consistently “NE beliefs”
even inside this one game.
There were 83 subjects who lacked NE beliefs in both
part of the Trust Game, 29 subjects who possessed “NE
beliefs” as Player 1 but not as Player 2, and only 5 subjects
who possessed “NE beliefs” as Player 2 but not as Player
1. Our experiment does not allow us to identify why
players’ beliefs diverge from the NE beliefs, but it is clear
that most subjects deviate from NE beliefs during at least
one of the experimental tasks.
There were 60 subjects who were “fully Nash actors”
in the Trust Game, that is, the subjects whose actions as
both Player 1 and 2 were consistent with SPNE strategy.
We examine whether these 60 subjects have beliefs that are
“fully Nash” in the Trust Game. The answer is no. First, let
us consider these 60 subjects in the role of Player 1 in
Trust. Of these 60 subjects, 56 guessed as Player 1 that
Player 2 would return nothing, which is consistent with
SPNE. Only 40 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (66%)
guessed that Player 2 predicted that they would transfer $0.
The other 20 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (1/3rd)
lacked that SPNE belief. 49 of the 60 also guessed Player
2’s prediction of Player 1’s guess of what Player 2 will
return to be $0. These results show that even the 60 “fully
Nash” Trust subjects hold beliefs whose degree of
consistency with SPNE principles varies question by
question even when we look at only those questions asked
of them when they are in the role of Player 1. Beliefs show
flexibility.
We next turn to the beliefs of those 60 “fully Nash”
Trust subjects when they are in the role of Player 2 in
Trust. Of the 60, 44 guess that Player 1 will transfer
nothing; that is, 16 of 60 (27%) lack SPNE beliefs. Of the
60, 35 guess that Player 1 predicts that they will return
nothing; that is, for this question, 42% of these 60 “fully
Nash” Trust subjects have beliefs that are inconsistent with
SPNE. Overall, non-SPNE beliefs are quite common even
among the 60 “fully Nash” actors in the Trust Game.
Beliefs show flexibility and refute the assumed beliefs of
Nash equilibrium and the four patches often applied to NE.

4 Result: Inconsistency of Behavior in
Trust, Donation, and Dictator
We turn next to examine the actions of subjects across
a number of similar tasks to see if individual subjects
behave consistently. In particular, we look at a set of tasks,
all of which involve choosing how much money to transfer
to another person and in some tasks the decision is not
contingent on the other player. In the Trust Game, subjects
play the role of Player 1 and 2 during the course of the
experiment.
One way to investigate consistency of behavior is to
examine the choices of subjects who as Player 2 in Trust
received money from Player 1. Of the 100 subjects who
received money as Player 2 in Trust, only 62 returned any
of the money to Player 1. Additionally, of those 62, only
40 sent money in the Dictator Game, which is identical to
the percentage of subjects who sent nothing in other
“double blind” versions of the Dictator Game [13]. This
shows that many subjects do not behave consistently in
these two identical choice situations, in which their actions
could reduce inequality. Further, of the 40 who sent money
in Dictator, only 29 also send money in the Donation
Game. This means that of the 100 subjects who received
money as Player 2 in Trust, only 29 sent money to the
other player in all three related tasks. This shows that the
same subjects do not behave consistently even in their
violations of SPNE.
Another example of apparently inconsistent behavior
comes from examining the subjects who passed $0 out of
$5 in the Donation Game, suggesting they are not
concerned with others’ earnings. Of the 87 subjects who
passed $0 in the Donation Game, 63 of them also passed
nothing as Player 1 in the Trust Game, both behaviors of
which are consistent with standard game theoretic
behavior. However, the other 24 subjects passed $0 in the
Donation Game and some amount greater than $0 in the
Trust Game. What model predicts this behavior? Why
would a player who passes nothing in the Donation Game
pass money in the Trust Game? One possibility is that the
player believes that passing money in Trust will result in
greater earnings, because Player 2 will return enough
money to make the choice to pass money financially
beneficial. However, among these 24 subjects some guess
they will earn money in the Trust Game and others guess
they will lose money. The lack of consistency in these two
very similar settings is further evidence that assumptions of
consistent behavior are at odds with much human action.
Subjects deviate remarkably from NE strategies. We
have reported how subjects’ beliefs deviate from those
necessary to support equilibrium strategies. We have also
shown that these deviations are not consistent.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that proposals to explain
deviation from NE strategies will succeed if they presume

a consistent mental or behavioral signature.
Now, we ask whether actions are minimally rational,
that is, do subjects’ actions accord with their beliefs? To
begin, we investigate whether action and belief accord in
the Trust Game. In our experiment, over one-half of
subjects in the role of Player 1 (100 out of 180) pass a
nonzero amount of money to Player 2 (this differs from
[27]), which is inconsistent with a SPNE strategy, and on
average subjects pass $1.44 (which is not significantly
different than the findings in [27]). Of the 100 subjects
who receive money as Player 2, 62 of them return some
money to Player 1. On net, Player 1 loses money (our
results here are almost identical to those by [27]).
To look at the relationship between beliefs and actions
we examine the difference between the amount Player 1
sends to Player 2 and the amount Player 1 guesses Player 2
will return. Recall that any money sent by Player 1 is
tripled before it is sent to Player 2 and added to Player 2’s
initial $5, (e.g., if Player 1 sends all $5, then Player 2 has
$20, and if Player 2 splits that money, then Player 1 and
Player 2 end with $10 each, and we would say that each
has “earned” $5 through their actions). Overall, there are
only a few players who guess that they will lose money by
sending money to the other player. Mostly, players expect
to break even or benefit slightly from their decision. The
beliefs held by these players imply not only that they do
not expect others to play consistently with SPNE
strategies, but also that they expect, on average, to profit
from their non-SPNE strategy to send money. But again,
beliefs are not consistent across subjects.
There are 100 subjects who as Player 1 in Trust chose
to send a positive amount to Player 2, and 20 of those
players guess they will not receive anything in return.
These 20 players guess that Player 2 will follow a SPNE
strategy. These 20 subjects cannot simultaneously be
maximizing their payoffs and hold the belief that Player 2
will follow a SPNE strategy of returning $0 so it is hard to
see how their choices accord with their own beliefs. We
must either conclude that they are not payoff maximizers
or relax the assumption that subjects act according to
beliefs. One possible response is to give up the assumption
that believing, preferring, deciding, and acting are
coordinated mental events. Perhaps subjects act without
fully activating their decisions, or believe without
activating the consequences of those beliefs for action, or
act without activating beliefs, and so on.
These results make it clear that we may not be able to
simply observe behavior and then make correct inferences
about the underlying beliefs that generated the behavior.
When we observe a Player 1 in the Trust Game pass
money what beliefs do we presume preceded that
behavior? Is this a subject who is motivated by otherregarding preferences who does not expect to benefit
financially? Or, is this a player who sincerely believes that

the 2nd player in the Trust Game will return enough money
to make the initial decision profitable?
There were 60 subjects who were “fully Nash actors”
throughout the game; that is, they chose SPNE strategies
(i.e., $0) as both Player 1 and Player 2., We ask whether
these 60 “fully-Nash” actors in Trust are “fully Nash” in
the related Donation and Dictator Games. Of these 60
subjects, 57 pass $0 in the Dictator Game and 50 of the 60
pass $0 in the Donation Game. If we focus on those 57
subjects who are “fully Nash actors” as both Player 1 and
Player 2 in Trust and also as Dictator in the Dictator Game,
we find that 48 of the 57 pass nothing in the Donation
Game. Therefore, across our entire subject pool, only 48
(27%) have consistent NE behavior in three related games
of Trust, Donation, and Dictator.
Although deviations in a single game have been
widely recognized, research has not focused on how
behavior across games is related. We have shown in a
variety of ways that NE-consistent behavior in one task
does not guarantee similar behavior in another setting.
Therefore, even accurately predicting a subjects’ action in
one setting is no guarantee that it is possible to predict
accurately the subjects’ action in another setting. We
demonstrate thisusing game theoretic environments that are
exceedingly similar, which would seem to stack the deck in
favor of finding consistent behavior across games.
However, the results from our battery of experimental
tasks demonstrate that subjects regularly deviate from
SPNE in both their beliefs and behavior, that the deviations
are themselves inconsistent, and that there is variation in
the degree to which behavior accords with belief. These
deviations are so pervasive and the variation so large, even
among subjects taking actions in similar or identical
strategic settings, that is seems unwarranted to refer to
them as “deviations.” On the contrary, even though our
subject pool is derived from subjects with very high math
SATs, who were on the whole in the top 2% of high school
graduates, consistent “NE behavior and beliefs” appear to
be remarkable deviations from human cognitive patterns
and human behavior.

5 Discussion
Games are defined by seven characteristics: players,
actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes, and
equilibria, including equilibrium refinement [33].
Equilibria must be mutually consistent, indeed, “[T]he
Nash equilibrium (NE) concept . . . entails the assumption
that all players think in a very similar manner when
assessing one another’s strategies. In a NE, all players in a
game base their strategies not only on knowledge of the
game’s structure but also on identical conjectures about
what all other players will do. The NE criterion pertains to
whether each player is choosing a strategy that is a best
response to a shared conjecture about the strategies of all

players. A set of strategies satisfies the criterion when all
player strategies are best responses to the shared
conjecture. In many widely used refinements of the NE
concept, such as subgame perfection and perfect Bayesian,
the inferential criteria also require players to have shared,
or at least very similar, conjectures” [23: 103-104]. NE is,
at its core, a cognitive theory.
In cognitive science, “theory of mind” refers to our
amazing disposition to attribute mindedness to other
human beings. Classical economics takes theory of mind
for granted, and extends it to the view that all of those
minds are driven by consistent preferences and beliefs to
consistent actions. Behavioral game theory applies patches
to come up with a conception of individual minds as
consistently deviant from classical rationality. Hence the
phrase “predictably irrational.” The difference between
classical rationality and behavioral game theory is not
about consistency: classical rationality assumes that
everyone is consistent in the same way, while behavioral
game theory assumes that each person is consistent in a
certain “deviant” way. While classical rationality and
behavioral game theory are often taken to be opposed, we
seem them as uniformly based on an assumption of
consistency that does not stand with experimental test.
Some scholars justify consistency as a mathematical
shortcut that is meant to represent the result of some
unspecified learning, evolutionary adjustment process, or
the adoption of social norms, laws or institutions [34].
These processes, however, are rarely defined. This line of
reasoning also implies that beliefs and choices will not be
consistent if players do not have time to learn or evolve.
As in many related experiments [for a survey see 8],
subjects in our experiments do indeed deviate from SPNE
predictions, both in their actions and in their beliefs. We
also demonstrate that subjects’ recursive beliefs (beliefs
about the beliefs of other players) are often inconsistent
with NE predictions, a result that has not been widely
appreciated. We show further that the variance in actions
and beliefs is very large.
Even the common patches of behavioral game theory
do not predict the tremendous diversity that we observed
for individual subjects and the variance across subjects’
beliefs and behavior. Subjects’ reported beliefs and their
behavior are regularly incongruent – subjects who play
consistently with NE prediction do not always possess the
assumed game theoretic beliefs. Furthermore, subjects’
beliefs differ across settings even when there are no
changes in the cognitive complexity of the setting. Taken
together these results suggest that game theoretic models
and common modifications employed to make them
explain the deviations from straightforward NE, do not
accurately predict the variations in behaviors we observe in
a laboratory setting. Therefore, research into decisionmaking should turn to discovering the cognitive patterns of
decision-making.
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